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Ecological Psychology is an embodied, situated, and non-representational approach
pioneered by J. J. Gibson and E. J. Gibson. This theory aims to offer a third way
beyond cognitivism and behaviorism for understanding cognition. The theory started
with the rejection of the premise of the poverty of the stimulus, the physicalist conception
of the stimulus, and the passive character of the perceiver of mainstream theories
of perception. On the contrary, the main principles of ecological psychology are the
continuity of perception and action, the organism-environment system as unit of
analysis, the study of affordances as the objects of perception, combined with an
emphasis on perceptual learning and development. In this paper, first, we analyze
the philosophical and psychological influences of ecological psychology: pragmatism,
behaviorism, phenomenology, and Gestalt psychology. Second, we summarize the main
concepts of the approach and their historical development following the academic
biographies of the proponents. Finally, we highlight the most significant developments of
this psychological tradition. We conclude that ecological psychology is one of the most
innovative approaches in the psychological field, as it is reflected in its current influence
in the contemporary embodied and situated cognitive sciences, where the notion of
affordance and the work of E. J. Gibson and J. J. Gibson is considered as a historical
antecedent.
Keywords: ecological psychology, Gibson, perception-action, affordances, specificity, perceptual learning,
pragmatism
INTRODUCTION
This article has been written to be part of the research topic “History of Psychology as a Scientific
Discipline,” an article collection for Frontiers in Psychology. Here we offer a succinct introduction to
the history and philosophy of ecological psychology for the general reader, aiming to complement former
introductions and works offered by researchers within this approach.
Ecological psychology is an embodied, situated, and non-representationalist approach to
cognition pioneered by J. J. Gibson (1904–1979) in the field of perception and by E. J. Gibson
(1910–2002) in the field of developmental psychology. Ecological psychology, in its very origins,
aimed to offer an innovative perspective for understanding perception and perceptual learning that
overcomes the traditional psychological dichotomies of perception/action, organism/environment,
subjective/objective, and mind/body. These dichotomies are at the basis of some theoretical
assumptions in the field of psychology, such as the poverty of stimulus and the passivity
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of perception. Precisely, the ecological approach challenged these
widely accepted ideas that mainstream experimental psychology
sustained during its run-up at the first half of the 20th
century. Thus, once the framework of ecological psychology
was established during the second half of the 20th century,
it became an alternative in the debate between cognitivism
and behaviorism. While both approaches considered themselves
as competitors, they were taken as complementary from an
ecological standpoint (Reed, 1991). This is so because they
emphasized distinct stages of a whole cognitive picture sustained
by the same principles. The ecological approach rejected the
inferential and representational commitment of cognitivism and
the physicalist idea of stimulus of behaviorism.
The main aim of this article is to offer a systematic
introduction to the history and theory of ecological psychology,
highlighting the academic biographies of the main proponents
of this framework and the philosophical concerns that guided
its genesis and development. It is not our objective to
give an exhaustive account of the framework, but to offer
a comprehensive overview of its main assumptions and
achievements. For doing this, in section Theoretical Influences
and the Genesis of Ecological Psychology we analyze the
theoretical influences of J. J. Gibson and E. J. Gibson
that shaped the ecological approach to perception from the
1920s to the 1950s. We focus on pragmatism, behaviorism,
phenomenology, and Gestalt theory as main influences. In
section The Establishment of the Ecological Account, we sketch
the main principles of ecological psychology that originated from
the 1960s to the 1970s and their reception in the neogibsonian
literature. These principles are perception-action, perceptual
systems, organism-environment system, ecological information,
specificity, affordances, and perceptual learning. In section
Relevant Developments, we explain the main progresses of the
ecological approach from the 1980s to the 2010s, emphasizing
the role of visual control of action and Lee’s tau (τ) theory and
its influence in the ecological approach. At this point, we also
highlight the developments of the so-called Connecticut School
(Heft and Richardson, 2013) and other relevant studies included
in the neogibsonian framework.
THEORETICAL INFLUENCES AND THE
GENESIS OF ECOLOGICAL
PSYCHOLOGY
In this section we analyze the main influences that gave
rise to ecological psychology. We identify three main sources
of influence: James’ radical empiricism and neutral monism,
behaviorism, phenomenology, and Gestalt theory.
Pragmatism
The first source of inspiration1 that J. J. Gibson took into
account for developing the ecological approach to cognition was
1As J. J. Gibson (1967/1982) stated, the person that most influenced his views
was his wife, E. J. Gibson, who made similar claims about her husband in her
autobiography (2002). However, here we focus exclusively in the theories that
influenced Ecological Psychology.
American pragmatism and, in particular, the ideas of James on
radical empiricism and neutral monism. J. J. Gibson was highly
influenced by Holt, who taught him the main principles of radical
empiricism at Princeton, were J. J. Gibson got his B.Sc., M.A.,
and Ph.D. (1925, 1926, and 1928, respectively) (Hochberg, 1994,
pp. 152–153).
According to pragmatism, practical consequences should
be taken as more relevant than abstract principles to explain
scientific practices, ethics, and cognition. This school rejects
some shared aspects of idealism and empiricism (the passivity
of perception and the representationalist account of the
mind) and focuses on the active capacities of organisms and
their adaptation to the environment for explaining cognition.
According to pragmatism, “individuals can never know the world
independently of their own experience” (Heft, 2001, p. 74).
James’ version of pragmatism includes an epistemic thesis, radical
empiricism, and a metaphysical thesis, neutral monism. These
two theses are intertwined. Radical empiricism claims that
our knowledge comes from experience, which is taken as the
capacity of engaging into meaningful interactions with the world.
These meaningful interactions include objects of perception, the
relations among those objects, and also the relations of those
objects to us. Thus, we experience those relations in a meaningful
and organized way. James concludes that we can describe this
relational world of pure experience either from the side of the
object (the sense datum) or from the side of the subject (the
experience). Therefore, this approach is called neutral monism:
there is only one stuff that can be described physically or
psychologically (James, 1895, p. 110).
The influence of radical empiricism in J. J. Gibson’s view is
quite clear: he claimed in his autobiography that he was a radical
empiricist J. J. Gibson (1967) and this view is at the very basis
of his description of affordances. Having in view the Jamesian
idea that pure experience can be described either physically or
psychologically, he defined affordances as “both physical and
psychical, yet neither” (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015, p. 121). This
description of affordances, as we can see, cannot be understood
without appealing to the influence of radical empiricism and
neutral monism.
In his last year as undergraduate student at Princeton, J. J.
Gibson took a course with Langfeld in experimental psychology.
The year after, Langfeld offered him an assistantship. That year,
Holt moved to Princeton, and taught J. J. Gibson the principles of
behaviorism and radical empiricism. Since then, in J. J. Gibson’s
words: “[f]or 30 years I was reluctant to abandon it [Holt’s motor
theory of consciousness]” (J. J. Gibson, 1967, p. 129). For all these
reasons, historians of ecological psychology understand that J. J.
Gibson’s approach to perception is an experimental version of
James’ radical empiricism (Heft, 2001).
Behaviorism
Many authors understand ecological psychology as a version of
behaviorism (Costall and Morris, 2015) and it is true that, in
his own words, J. J. Gibson “became excited by the behaviorist
revolution” (J. J. Gibson, 1967, p. 128). We think that the origin
of the sympathies of J. J. Gibson toward behaviorism came from
Holt’s unorthodox understanding of behaviorism.
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Although Holt was close to James and some of his
ideas, he did consider himself neither a pragmatist nor a
behaviorist (Langfeld, 1946, pp. 251–255). He endorsed a
Jamesian concept of consciousness; this is, he understood
consciousness as an activity rather than as a reified object
of study. But, at the same time, he combined this idea with
the methods of behaviorism (although reacting against the
passivity of perception usually accepted by this approach),
creating his own motor theory of consciousness. Holt also
included in his explanations aspects of behavior rejected by
traditional behaviorism, such as goals or plans (Holt, 1914).
In fact, the problem of purposive behavior is much more
emphasized in Holt’s explanation of behavior than in traditional
behaviorism.
At his respect, note that Tolman, another student of Holt,
emphasized purposive behavior in his behaviorist view and
developed the idea of ‘sign Gestalt’ as external relations among
objects that explain their demanding character (see section
Gestalt Psychology). This idea is quite similar to J. J. Gibson’s
idea of affordance (Warren, 1984, p. 684). E. J. Gibson also
found similarities between J. J. Gibson’s notion of affordance
and Tolman’s idea of ‘manipulanda’ for explaining what he
called behavior-support. According to Tolman, behavior-support
were characters in the environment that helped behavior-acts
to go without disruption. Manipulanda were the characters
of objects that supported motor activity (properties such as
lengths, fluidities, or solidities) that were not defined ‘in
themselves’ but with regard to the kinds of manipulations
that they support for a given organism (sit-in-able-nesses,
pick-up-able-nesses, etc.) (Tolman, 1932, p. 448, as cited in
E. J. Gibson, 1982, p. 61). Although there are key differences
between J. J. Gibson’s ecological approach and Tolman’s
behaviorism, there are enough similarities between manipulanda
and affordances to consider the former as an inspiration of the
latter.
It is also worth mentioning that E. J. Gibson was fond
of this sort of behaviorism with a pragmatist turn. Her work
was highly influenced during her Ph.D. studies by Hull (1929)
another behaviorist. In particular, his paper “A functionalist
interpretation of the conditioned reflex”, where he reinterpreted
the behaviorist conditioned reflex in a pragmatist way, was
specially inspiring for her (E. J. Gibson, 1991, 2002; p. 5, 28).
Despite its influence, ecological psychology offers some of
the most powerful arguments against behaviorism. J. J. Gibson
rejected the behaviorist idea of stimulus for two reasons: first,
because it was measured as a physical unit (light, pressure,
waves of sound) unrelated to the agent’s capacities; second,
because it was passively received by the senses, whereas ecological
psychology emphasized the active exploratory role of the agent.
Therefore, J. J. Gibson understood the senses as perceptual
systems (J. J. Gibson, 1966), as we will see in section Perception-
Action Loop and Perceptual Systems. The behaviorist idea
of stimulus was subsumed within the cognitivist approach,
where it was enriched and stored to generate representations
(Reed, 1991; see also section Perceptual Learning), something
that J. J. Gibson and E. J. Gibson (1955) directly rejected.
Thus, he developed his own idea of ‘stimulus information,’
now named ecological information that we analyze in section
Organism-Environment System, Ecological Information, and
Specificity.
Gestalt Psychology
Koffka, Wertheimer, and Köhler were the main representatives of
Gestalt psychology, a theory that defended a phenomenological
approach to perceptual consciousness understood as the primacy
of the mental organization. Gestaltists embraced some kind of
dualism between the mental and physical realms, and suggested
that mental organization mimics, or is isomorphic to, physical
properties.
Gestalt theory influenced ecological psychology in many
ways. First, as shown in the previous section, the varieties
of pragmatism and behaviorism in which J. J. Gibson was
educated prevented him from accepting the anti-positivist and
anti-empiricist theses of Gestalt psychology. In his doctoral
dissertation, J. J. Gibson refuted the explanation of Wulf, a
student of Koffka in Berlin, who argued that memories of visually
perceived forms are reproduced according to the principles of
Gestalt organization. J. J. Gibson (1929) published these results
in the Journal of Experimental Psychology in 1929 and interpreted
them as showing the effect of perceptual habits according to Holt’s
quasi-behaviorism. In J. J. Gibson’s words:
“The types of change here observed may all be explained,
it is believed, by the supposition that the experience of the
individual has brought into existence certain habitual modes of
perception, and that these perceptual habits, rather than the laws
of configurations, condition the changes observed” (J. J. Gibson,
1929, p. 35).
On the other hand, J. J. Gibson confronted the elementarist-
inferential tradition of experimental psychology by arguing
against the sensation-perception dichotomy and the poverty of
stimulus. He did so by appealing to the ideas of higher order
variables (like optic flow, see sections Organism-Environment
System, Ecological Information, and Specificity and Visual
Control of Action and Tau Theory) and meaning thanks to
the notion of affordances (possibilities for action, see section
Affordances). Some authors interpreted his arguments and ideas
as inspired by the Gestalt tradition (e.g., Jenkins, 2008; Richards,
2012).
After obtaining his Ph.D. in Psychology in 1928, J. J. Gibson
moved to teach Psychology at Smith College, where he became a
colleague of Koffka. They were in contact until 1941, when Koffka
passed away and J. J. Gibson joined the Air Force. An essential
aspect that J. J. Gibson inherited from Gestalt psychology is the
idea that the objects of perception (the Gestalten) are our primary
way of engaging with the world, that the experience is given to us
by certain laws that shape it, and that there is no point in reducing
those objects into simpler physical units or elements that are
recombined in our head because they are already structured and
meaningful. Although J. J. Gibson never accepted the Gestaltist
distinction of the mental and the physical, the ideas of the
irreducible aspect of our experience and the seek for its lawful
description were taken by J. J. Gibson and lead him to develop
the concepts of affordance and ecological scale (the psychological
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level for explaining behavior, see section Organism-Environment
System, Ecological Information and Specificity).
Regarding affordances, J. J. Gibson accepted the Gestaltist
conception of the stimulus as having a functional relation with
the perceiver. Gestaltists understood that meaning or values
were subjectively imposed to the natural word, and they offered
different characterizations for explaining this. Lewin developed
the word Aufforderungscharakter, while Koffka preferred the
term ‘demanding character’ (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015; p. 130;
E. J. Gibson, 1982, p. 61). However, J. J. Gibson (1982, p. 409)
rejected an essential aspect of this idea: “[t]he crux of this
theory is that the demand character, like the valence, was
assumed to be in the phenomenal but not in the physical
object.” He believed that this character was not subjectively
imposed.
Phenomenology
Another tradition that has been influential for the development
of J. J. Gibson’s approach is phenomenology (Heft, 2001, pp.
114–123). J. J. Gibson would have learned about phenomenology
thanks to Langfeld, chairman of the psychology department at
Princeton, who in turn studied in Berlin in 1903 under Carl
Stumpf, an early advocate of phenomenology and student of
Franz Brentano; also, J. J. Gibson was colleague of Fritz Heider
and Kurt Koffka at Smith College, and both helped bring the
phenomenological approach from Europe to the United States
(Heft, 2001, p. 117). Phenomenology is a philosophical approach
that aims to explain the structures that allow us to have
experience of the world (Käufer and Chemero, 2015); or, in other
words, to offer “a direct description of our experience as it is
without taking account of its psychological origin and the causal
explanations which the scientist, the or the sociologist may be
able to provide” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012, p. vii). Although
J. J. Gibson developed a scientific approach, the idea of offering a
non-reductive “direct description of our experience” goes in line
with his views.
In particular, J. J. Gibson’s approach has been said to parallel
the work of Merleau-Ponty (Heft, 2001, p. 93, footnote 17, p. 117;
Glotzbach and Heft, 1982). Beyond the previously mentioned
historical account, authors such as Mace (2014) claimed that J. J.
Gibson wrote some notes in the early 1970s on Merleau-Ponty’s
(1945/2012) Phenomenology of Perception (Chemero and Käufer,
2016, p. 67). According to those notes, Merleau-Ponty exerted
considerable influence on Gibson, especially regarding the ideas
of occlusion and depth.
However, besides those ideas, and after a careful reading of
each author’s works, there is reason to believe that Merleau-
Ponty’s notion of body schema was also influential for J. J.
Gibson. Merleau-Ponty’s approach to phenomenology was quite
unique at the time: he believed that the structures that allowed
for cognition were not cultural or purely mental, but bodily
structures. Perceiving is the primordial way of knowing, but
in this view, perception is the result of comporting toward
the surrounding objects in a meaningful sense (Merleau-Ponty,
1945/2012). Thus, in this view, dealing with the environment is
an exploratory activity of the agent that is also guided by the
environment, something quite similar to the action-perception
loop of the organism in ecological psychology. This gives rise to
the idea of the body schema, a central concept in Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenology. It is the pre-conscious system that emerges by
the combination of the bodily capacities of the agent and the
complementing aspects of the environment (Toadvine, 2016). As
defined by Merleau-Ponty, “[t]he body schema is, in the end, a
manner of expressing that my body is in and toward the world”
(Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012, p. 103). Note the similarities with
the idea of organism-environment mutuality: in both pictures
there is a reciprocity of actions of the agent and elements of the
environment that together make emerge a meaningful history
of interactions. This Merleau-Ponty an configuration of our
surrounding elements as connected to our capacities and actions
is what provides experience with meaning (Kelly, 2004), and
this is in line with the idea of the ecological meaning of the
environment for the agent. The exploratory capacities of the
agent are of course active, “causing a thousand signs to appear
there, as if by magic, guide action” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/2012,
p. 115). The environment also guides and constraints behavior
in this approach through signs, and those signs are also partially
generated by the active capacities of agents. This is clearly in
line with the Gibsonian view by which the combination of
action and environmental elements gives rise to the emergence of
ecological information and affordances. Those signs are similar
to affordances, because they are meaningful in an embodied
way and guide the agent’s behavior. Besides, this body schema
of actions and signs generates a network of attractions and
repulsions similar to the way in which J. J. Gibson introduced the
idea of positive and negative affordances. As we can see, there are
many elements in the Gibsonian account that parallel the ideas of
Merleau-Ponty.
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE
ECOLOGICAL ACCOUNT
The birth of the ecological account can be followed through the
work of the Gibsons and their collaborators. J. J. Gibson’s joined
the Air Force in the 1940s and his work on aviation studies
lead him to publish The perception of the visual world (1950)
(Lombardo, 1987/2017). In this book, J. J. Gibson took the retinal
image as the basic visual stimulus for perception, although his
concept was not equivalent to a static picture, as it was conceived
at that time. In the next decade, J. J. Gibson substituted the idea
of retinal image with the optic array (Lombardo, 1987/2017) (see
section Organism-Environment System, Ecological Information,
and Specificity). In the 1960s, he published The senses considered
as perceptual systems, a book in which the traditional Aristotelian
account of the senses changed to be defined as active “systems
rather than channels” (J. J. Gibson, 1966, p. 47). In the same
decade E. J. Gibson published Principles of perceptual learning
and development (1969), where she proposed a working principle
related to the concept of specificity: the principle of reduction
of uncertainty. Her work delved into ontogeny and perceptual
learning (as we will see in section Perceptual Learning) and on
reading (E. J. Gibson and Levin, 1975), while J. J. Gibson focused
on perception. He published his most famous book, The ecological
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approach to visual perception (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015), only a few
months before his death. E. J. Gibson survived her husband for
more than 20 years, publishing two more scientific books (E. J.
Gibson, 1991; E. J. Gibson and Pick, 2000) and one autobiography
(E. J. Gibson, 2002), among other things.
In this section, we have selected the main ideas that guided the
development of this psychological tradition and its reception in
the neogibsonian framework.
Perception-Action Loop and Perceptual
Systems
The relationship between perception and action has been a
major topic in the psychological literature before the birth
of the ecological account. For example, Dewey (1896) argued
against explaining behavior through sensory stimulus and motor
responses. He proposed the sensorimotor coordination process
for explaining experience. The ecological tradition agrees with
Dewey’s idea that perception must be considered an active
process in which the agents’ exploration, perception, and action
are parts of the same activity. Although J. J. Gibson did not
mention Dewey as an influence, E. J. Gibson cited Dewey and
presented his work as an antecedent of the ecological approach
(E. J. Gibson, 1988, p. 5):
“We don’t simply see, we look. The visual system is a motor
system as well as a sensory one. When we seek information
in an optic array, the head turns, the eyes tum to fixate, the
lens accommodates to focus, and spectacles may be applied and
even adjusted by head position for far or near looking. This is a
point long emphasized by functional psychologists such as Dewey
(1896) and Woodworth (1958). It was developed in detail by
Gibson – e.g., in his experiments on active touch (1962).”
One of the first works of J. J. Gibson that conceived perception
as an active process is found in the experimental studies on
driving that he performed during the 1930s. J. J. Gibson and
Crooks (1938) realized that the analysis of driving behavior could
be made as a variation of Lewin’s (1936) ideas on locomotion
(1936) introducing dynamic concepts such as the visual field,
a precursor of optic flow (see section Visual Control of Action
and Tau Theory). On the one hand, this study is interesting
because it is another example of the influence of Gestalt theory
in J. J. Gibson. On the other hand, this early work considers
perception beyond the static, contemplative process traditionally
depicted during the 19th century. The active character of
perception was fully accepted for J. J. Gibson in subsequent
years and, finally, perception and action were presented as
interdependent in J. J. Gibson’s (1966) book. In this book, he
emphasized the exploratory activity, including head and eye
movements for vision and hand movements for haptics, for
example. Consistently, J. J. Gibson’s idea of perceptual systems
implied that there is an intrinsic coordination of perception
and action when one of these systems is functioning. Following
J. J. Gibson’s (1966) contribution, sense modalities should not
be understood as subpersonal systems in which specialized
receptors (photoreceptors, for example) are stimulated by a
sensory stimulus (photons) producing a sensory impression that
is enriched or transformed to form a representation. According
to J. J. Gibson, animals evolved not only to be sensitive to
sensory stimuli, but also to detect ecological information. What is
needed for this is not only the subpersonal neural pathways and
systems, but also a range of behaviors that are instrumental in
revealing and picking-up ecological information: these behaviors
extend to the eye-brain connection and include movements in
the eyes, head, and body that facilitate the detection of ecological
information in the array. Thus, a sense modality is considered
as a perceptual system when it includes this range of behaviors
of the animal taken as a whole (Glotzbach and Heft, 1982,
p. 112). One of the most interesting topics in this book is
the haptic system, especially dynamic touching (1966, p. 127),
the term that he proposed for the active touch that involves
exploration, wielding, and manipulation of objects. It is also
interesting to note that J. J. Gibson also advanced the importance
of inertia for dynamic touch, a research field that still has a very
important research agenda, as we will see in section Dynamic
Touch.
Regarding the concept of perception-action loop, the
ecological approach includes the active character of perception
as one of its distinctive features. Richardson et al. (2008, p. 174)
clearly summarized the ecological viewpoint remarking that
the perception-action cycle is not a merely reformulation of
the interaction or influence of two processes, but the statement
that “perception and action are of the same logical kind,
and are mutual, reciprocal, and symmetrically constraining.”
Thus, perceptual systems orient the perceptual organs and
make adjustments in the exploration to resonate when
ecological information is picked up. Its picking up is the
reason why organism and environment are entangled in action-
perception dynamics (see Warren, 2006, for a comprehensive
explanation of perception-action loops from a neogibsonian
framework).
Organism-Environment System,
Ecological Information, and Specificity
The organism-environment duality is probably the most
important dichotomy that ecological psychology aimed to
overcome. This traditional dichotomy has a broader scope
than the mind-body problem, which has been extensively
discussed in psychology (Michaels and Carello, 1981), and its
implications are even more relevant that the ones produced by
the rejection of the perception-action dichotomy that we outlined
in section Perception-Action Loop and Perceptual Systems.
As Costall (2004) pointed out, the pragmatist tradition and
its relation to Darwinian ideas directly influenced ecological
psychology for rejecting the organism-environment dualism. If
one follows the academic biography of J. J. Gibson, organism-
environment mutuality is not present in his early work on
psychophysics (Lombardo, 1987/2017). However, his thought
evolved to recognize an essential reciprocity between perceiver
and environment, as he clearly stated it at the beginning of his
last book (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015, p. 4):
“(. . .) it is often neglected that the words animal and environment
make an inseparable pair. Each term implies the other. No animal
could exist without an environment surrounding it. Equally,
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although not so obvious, an environment implies an animal (or
at least an organism) to be surrounded.”
On the one hand, it is an easy assumption that organisms live
in an environment. The degree of reciprocity between organism
and environment may vary among psychological traditions, but
it seems impossible to propose an organism living in total
emptiness. On the other hand, the difference between world and
environment is key, because the world is the surroundings of the
animals described in terms of physics, while the environment is
the surroundings described in ecological terms: this is, taking
them as related to the organism’s capacities. It is precisely
the confusion between environment and physical world what
reveals that a dualism is functioning (Michaels and Carello,
1981), implicitly or explicitly. The Gibsonian description of
the environment is not a physicalist account of the concept
but an ecological one (Lombardo, 1987/2017). This means that
physical metrics are not useful to explain behavior as they
do not relate to organisms (Richardson et al., 2008). Instead,
environmental realities (events, for example, that are related
to the organism that perceive them) are the relevant realities
for a psychological explanation because they are meaningful:
they relate to their capacities. The neogibsonian framework
provided a set of good examples of ecological metrics through the
mathematical operationalization of affordances, as we will see in
section Affordances.
But, how organisms deal with their environments? How can
they perceive the affordances -that is, the possibilities for action?
Agents need to detect potential damages and take advantage
of resources in their environment. Thus, organisms need to
detect meaningful information to behave properly. However,
sensory stimulation is not sufficient for perception, because there
can be sensory stimulation without perception as it happens,
for example, in the case of a fog-filled room: light produces
the excitement of the specialized photoreceptors, but the agent
cannot perceive her surroundings because she cannot see the
surfaces of the room (Chemero, 2009, p. 107). However, when
the fog is removed, the light reflects differentially in the surfaces
of the room, so it constitutes an ambient optic array with the
features of the surfaces specified in the structure of the light array.
The idea is summarized as follows:
Light originating from an energy source such as the sun is
selectively absorbed and reflected by the surfaces of objects
(which are the interfaces between the substances of which
the objects are made and the medium – in this case, air).
As reflected light reverberates off the surfaces, it fills the
medium with ambient light. Since the surfaces of objects differ
in their orientation to the light source, as well as in shape,
texture, pigmentation, and motion, the ambient light takes on
a corresponding (heterogeneous) structure (Glotzbach and Heft,
1982, p. 111).
This heterogeneous structure is the ambient optic array,
and that is what shows the agent the different possibilities
for acting in the environment – hence light is informative2
2Marr’s approach to vision differs substantially from J. J. Gibson’s, since the former
proposed an information-processing view that was rejected by the latter. Marr
about the environment The information in the array is
not located in individual points of stimulation, but in the
structure of the whole pattern; that is, in higher-order variables.
This information is ecological because it shows the way
in which the surroundings are disposed in relation to a
perceiver’s point of observation. The ecological character is
given not only by light itself as a physical energy, but
also by the action of the agent. As Gibson claimed, “[a]n
affordance, as I said, points two ways, to the environment
and to the observer. So does the information to specify
an affordance” (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015, p. 132, emphasis
added).
Ecological information is informative of the environment
because it specifies the available affordances. ‘Specificity’ refers
to the idea by which the presence of ecological information
corresponds to the direct perception of affordances. Some authors
interpret the meaning of specificity as in legal contracts: as a
guarantee for the presence of certain elements (for example,
a certain pattern of light guarantees a surface) (Käufer and
Chemero, 2015, p. 157). Nevertheless, most authors understand
specificity as based on natural law. For example, the ambient
optic array specifies the environment because of the laws of
optics, that is, because each object and surface reflect the light
differentially. Specificity, then, can be conceived as the nexus
between ecological information and environmental properties.
An important aspect of specificity is that it allows for the lawful
character of ecological information. In this sense, “[e]cological
information is lawful not in the Newtonian sense of being
universal in space and time, but in an ecological sense of being
regular within an ecological context of constraint” (Warren,
2005, pp. 342–343). When the agent explores the environment
and encounters this ecological information, the agent uses that
information for guiding its intentional behavior (Reed, 1983,
p. 90). What follows from the detection or picking up is that
there is no need to process and enrich the ecological information,
since it is sufficiently informative of the affordances of the
environment as for guiding the behavior of the agent by itself.
In this sense, non-representationalism and the rejection of
cognitive processing is a consequence of both the specificity and
the picking up of ecological information. For this reason, the
detection of ecological information implies the direct perception
of affordances.
Ecological psychology focuses on the organism-environment
coupling and not on what happens at the subpersonal, neural
level. However, this does not mean that this level of description
(1982/2010, pp. 29–31) analyzed the ecological approach and claimed that J. J.
Gibson did a great job in answering how one can obtain constant perception
on the basis of continually changing stimulation. Nevertheless, Marr rejected
the ecological approach since he seriously underestimated the complexity of the
information-processing problems in vision. The problem is that J. J. Gibson himself
claimed that ecological information was not the kind of information as found in
the information-processing approach, since he considered that this latter kind of
information was based on Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication, and
it implied a sender, a receiver, and a signal that transmitted a message that had to be
reconstructed. This kind of information for communication is not the same as the
one found in the ambient optic array. For this reason, “[t]he information that can
be extracted from ambient light is not the kind of information that is transmitted
over a channel. There is no sender outside the head and no receiver inside the head”
(J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015, p. 57).
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is not important for enabling the whole process of perception.
As Travieso and Jacobs (2009, p. 403) claimed: “Note, though,
that one cannot reject the validity of studies with smaller or
larger levels of analysis; that would be analogous, we think, to
rejecting current neurobiology because subatomic particles are
not taken into account.” In this sense, J. J. Gibson understood
that at a neural level, the systems do not compute, transform,
or enrich information, but that they “resonate” to ecological
information (J. J. Gibson, 1966, p. 5), an idea that resembles
current dynamic approaches to neuroscience (Freeman, 2000;
Raja, 2018).
The relation between the ecological approach and cognitive
neuroscience can also be seen in the discussion on the two visual
streams (ventral and dorsal) proposal by Goodale et al. (1991);
Goodale and Milner (1992); and Milner and Goodale (1995),
and their linkage to computational and ecological theories,
respectively (Norman, 2002). Ecological psychologists question
this proposal for two main reasons (Michaels, 2000). The first one
was that the so-called ventral system retained all the postulates
that sustain the need of inferential and computational process
in perception, which, in turn, gave rise to the ecological critique
(i.e., the poverty of the stimulus, the passivity of the perceiver,
etc.). Second, because the concept of action used to define the
dorsal stream was restricted to performatory action, ignoring the
exploratory actions in which perception is based according to
the ecological approach. In other words, perception for action
was described as a unidirectional function, in which perception
guided action, not as a perception-action loop.
In addition, it is important to highlight that the “perception for
action” functioning of the dorsal stream has been widely accepted
by the cognitive neuroscience community. However, there is
no computational description of its functioning (the “how”),
being their evidences based on behavioral and clinical data. It
is assumed, therefore, that the computational-representational
level of analysis is not compulsory for describing a psychological
function.
Affordances
‘Affordance’ is the ecological concept that has had a major
diffusion since it was coined in the 1960s (J. J. Gibson, 1966,
p. 285), although J. J. Gibson used some terms for affordances
previously (J. J. Gibson, 1950, pp. 198–199). He proposed
‘affordance’ as an alternative for ‘value’ as it is used in philosophy.
During the 1970s, J. J. Gibson (1977) refined the term while his
colleagues started to spread it in their works (see, for example,
Reed and Jones, 1977; E. J. Gibson et al., 1978). J. J. Gibson
(1979/2015) argued that affordances are the main objects of
perception in his theory: the possibilities for action that the
environment allows for an organism (Reed and Jones, 1982). For
example, we do not perceive steps in centimeters, but whether
or not we can step on them. Affordances are defined in the
organism-environment level of analysis: an organism embedded
in her system knows her environment because she perceives
affordances.
Gibson claimed that perceiving affordances is perceiving
ecological meaning (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015, pp. 131–132), which
is perceiving how the surroundings are related to the agent’s
capacities. The idea of affordance shows that an organism does
not perceive an objective, value-free, physical world in which
meaning is imposed, as in Gestalt theory (see section Gestalt
Psychology). We do not create affordances when we perceive
them (Michaels, 2000), they already exist in the system as
constant relations between organism and environment. The
detection of information amounts to affordance perception, so
affordances are meaningful objects of perception in an organism-
environment system. In Richardson et al. (2008) words:
“[A]ffordances are perceived by detecting lawfully structured
information (...) that invariantly specifies features (capabilities)
of a particular perceiving-acting agent in relation to features of
a particular substance, surface, object, or event. A water surface
with adequate tension can afford locomotion for an insect but not
a human.” (Richardson et al., 2008, p. 179).
Norman’s (1988) book originally named The psychology of
everyday things, later named The design of everyday things (1988)
is one of the works that popularized affordances. Although E. J.
Gibson (2002) did not mention the episode in her biography,
Norman (1999) wrote that J. J. Gibson and himself met and
discussed the theory of affordances during the spring of 1979,
when the Gibsons visited the Salk Institute in California. At the
beginning, Norman disliked the theory of affordances, but he
defended the importance of the term years later, even discussing
the careless use of the concept:
“Far too often I hear graphic designers claim that they have added
an affordance to the screen design when they have done nothing
of the sort. Usually they mean that some graphical depiction
suggests to the user that a certain action is possible. This is not
affordance, either real or perceived. Honest, it isn’t. It is a symbolic
communication, one that works only if it follows a convention
understood by the user.” (Norman, 1999, p. 40).
Despite its centrality within ecological psychology, there is not
a single definition shared by all ecological psychologists. We can
differentiate between those authors who claim that affordances
are properties of the environment that are complemented by
aspects of organisms, while there are other authors claiming that
affordances are properties of the organism-environment system.
In the first group, Turvey et al. (1981) and Turvey (1992)
developed a dispositional theory of affordances, taken as
properties of the environment that are complemented by
effectivities of animals (causal propensities to effect a particular
action, see section Effectivities). Affordances always actualize
when both properties are together under the right circumstances
(Turvey, 1992, p. 178). Stoffregen (2003) reacts against this
view because the idea that affordances are complemented
by effectivities implies that affordances are properties of the
environment alone, and also thinks that affordances should
be better understood as emergent properties of the organism-
environment system (Stoffregen, 2003, p. 118). Another aspect
of Turvey’s dispositional approach is that, while dispositions
never fail to actualize, an animal may fail when is taking
advantage of an affordance (Chemero, 2009, p. 145). In this
sense, the actualization of an affordance is not as rigid as
chemical or physical processes, because they are based on the
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performance of certain abilities. We think that this emphasis on
the physicalist model is the reason behind Reed’s understanding
of affordances as aspects of the environment that exert selection
pressure (Reed, 1996, pp. 18, 31). Chemero considers that this
view is equally problematic, because if animals should conform
or adapt to the pressures of affordances, then it breaks the
organism-environment mutuality or reciprocity (Chemero, 2009,
p. 146). In addition, Chemero (2009, pp. 120–121, 218) considers
that affordances should be taken as normative relations of the
organism-environment systems, and the set of all affordances for
a given organism is its ecological niche. However, this approach
is also problematic, since the introduction of normativity in the
picture goes against the lawful definition of specificity (as we will
see in Specificity) and, therefore, against direct perception.
One of the major advances on the empirical and mathematical
study of affordances was made in the famous study of Warren
(1984) on climbability. In this study, participants were separated
into two groups depending on their height (short people vs.
tall people) and they were asked to judge if they could climb
on steps of different heights placed in front of them. As
expected, tall participants judged as climbable higher steps than
short participants. Warren analyzed at which point participants
reached a critical step (i.e., a step that, when presented multiple
times, in 50% of cases was judged as climbable and 50% of
cases as non-climbable). He noticed that the critical step height
was related to the body size of participants, and he proposed a
biomechanical model that pointed out the importance of body
measures: Rc = Leg + ULeg – Lleg, being Rc the critical step
height, Leg the leg length, ULeg the upper leg length, and Lleg the
lower leg length. When Warren divided the critical step height
(that he empirically found for the two groups of participants)
by their leg length, the significant differences between the two
groups disappeared. Moreover, he claimed that a person estimates
as climbable those steps that are less than 0.88 times her leg
length. Thus, this mathematical formulation inaugurated a set of
studies that tried to identify the possibilities for action allowed
by a surface or object for a given organism in relation to its
body measures. His methodology was promptly used for studying
other affordances (e.g., Warren and Whang, 1987; van der Meer,
1997).
Perceptual Learning
Although perceptual learning is an area of research, not a
concept or idea, we think it is necessary to delve into this
topic to give a more complete view of the foundation and
reception of ecological psychology. J. J. Gibson (1966, preface)
stated that since 1963 he focused on the development of a
theory of perception, while his wife concentrated in perceptual
learning. Thus, both branches of the ecological account were
developed almost in parallel during the seventies (Rader, 2018)
and, therefore, there are subtle differences in their assumptions
that might be important for a theory of perceptual learning and
development, according to Read and Szokolszky (2018). Before
this task division, the Gibsons worked together in the rejection
of what they called ‘enrichment theories’ (J. J. Gibson and E. J.
Gibson, 1955), as when they claimed: “We have no patience
with the attempts to patch up the S-R formula with hypotheses
of mediation” (J. J. Gibson, 1967, p. 132). Precisely, Gregory’s
theory of indirect perception motivated the unique contribution
co-authored by the Gibsons after the task division, due to
their common interest in the rejection of enrichment theories
(E. J. Gibson and J. J. Gibson, 1972). These theories depart
from the poverty and ambiguity of the stimulus and conceive
perceptual learning as the process of inferentially disambiguate
and enrich the stimulation with previous knowledge. On the
other hand, differentiation theories account for a refinement
(differentiation) of the stimulation, information, or impressions,
and this include Gestalt psychology and the specificity theory (see
E. J. Gibson and Pick, 2000, for a more detailed classification of
perceptual learning theories and their historical development).
The ecological approach to perceptual learning aims to explain
how perceivers take advantage of the specific and redundant
information available in the ambient energy arrays (E. J. Gibson,
1969; E. J. Gibson and Pick, 2000). This is, perceptual learning
has to do with the processes of attunement and calibration. First,
organisms must engage into an attunement process (to learn how
to detect specific information for affordances); second, they need
to adjust their behavior to an informational variable (a calibration
process). The most important experimental paradigm for this
line of research is known as “the visual cliff,” an experimental
procedure developed by E. J. Gibson. It consists on a walkable
or crawlable platform that includes an actual cliff covered with
a transparent surface, which protects participants from falling,
although they still have visual information of the cliff. This was
firstly tested on animals, and later on crawling infants. E. J.
Gibson and Walk (1960; see also Walk and E. J. Gibson, 1961)
showed that, as soon as infants crawled, they perceived a cliff
because infants avoid crossing even when their mothers called
them from the other side of the cliff. However, it was very difficult
to test their behavior before they could crawl (see Rader, 2018, for
a recent review on experiments that followed the “visual cliff”).
The reception of E. J. Gibson’s work on development and
perceptual learning has been noticeable. Remarkable examples
are the work of Adolph et al. (1997) and the direct learning
theory detailed in section Development and Learning. In this
same vein, a recent proposal reunites the outcomes of J. J.
Gibson and E. J. Gibson together with certain developments
in evolutionary biology and psychology for establishing a
developmental ecological psychology (Read and Szokolszky,
2018).
RELEVANT DEVELOPMENTS
During the 1970s and 1980s, an increasing number of scholars
engaged in the development of the ecological approach. Mace
(2015) describes the first expansion of the program in 1970, when
Shaw and Lee visited Cornell to study with the Gibsons at the
Airport Lab. After this, Lee returned to Edinburgh, where he
developed the tau theory described in section Visual Control
of Action and Tau Theory, whereas Shaw joined Turvey at the
University of Connecticut in 1975. Together with Mace, Carello,
Michaels and others they formed what has been named by
some authors as the Connecticut School. These scholars had an
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outstanding role in the foundation of the International Society for
Ecological Psychology (ISEP), the journal Ecological Psychology,
and the Center for the Ecological Study of Perception and Action
(CESPA) at the University of Connecticut, the leading center in
the deployment of the ecological psychology program. Since then,
several developments on ecological psychology were published
(Mace, 2015), such as the work on tau theory by Lee, the main
publications of the Connecticut school (Turvey et al., 1978, 1981;
Michaels and Carello, 1981; Shaw et al., 1982), the work on
body-scaled affordances by Warren, the first applications of the
ecological theory to social aspects (Heft, 1989; Costall, 1995),
the work of Adolph, Eppler, and E. J. Gibson on developmental
psychology and learning (Adolph et al., 1993a,b), the first books
on J. J. Gibson by Lombardo (1987/2017) and Reed (1988), and
the introduction of the metaphor of the polar planimeter by
Runeson (1977).
To summarize these developments, first we will resume the
studies on visual control of movement and the tau theory
developed by Lee, and the work on specificity and effectivities
developed by the Connecticut school. We will finish the section
by introducing the first developments of several prominent
research areas in ecological psychology.
Visual Control of Action and Tau Theory
Lee started to study the optic flow with the Gibsons (Lee, 2009).
After this, he developed his well-known studies with the “moving
room” on visual kinesthesis (Lee and Aronson, 1974; Lee and
Lishman, 1975), where he showed the strong influence of visual
information over non-visual proprioceptive information in the
control of stance.
Lee also worked in a mathematical definition of a perceptual
invariant capable of explaining the visual control and timing of
collisions. He proposed a mathematical invariant specific to time-
to-contact, tau (τ), defined as the rate of acceleration of optical
expansion (Lee, 1976). Originally, the work focused on collision
avoidance, such as braking, but rapidly evolved to preparation
for a contact (Lee and Reddish, 1981). In his first study, Lee
(1976) used the example of a car following another vehicle that
suddenly brakes. How does the driver know how hard should
be the brake? Lee realized that distance and speed were not
needed for controlling braking and judging the possibility for
colliding. Rather, monitoring the expansion in the visual angle
of the object in the direction of motion is informative enough
to help a driver controlling her action. Through the detection of
this rate of expansion, a car following another vehicle can avoid
collision thanks to the specification of the “time left until contact
at the current speed.”
Tau theory is one of the best-known examples derived
from experimental results in the ecological framework, and its
applications rapidly expanded (Lee et al., 1983; Craig et al., 2000;
see also Lee, 2009 for a review of tau theory). Although the
original tau index has been surpassed by later work (Tresilian,
1999), it became a cornerstone that gave rise to an entirely
novel approach to the study of the control of locomotion and
interception tasks. Researchers have proposed other variables to
control braking and movement when an environmental situation
affords collision. For example, Zaal and Bootsma (1995) showed
that a driver could also adjust deceleration using the rate of
change of tau. Other authors have shown that other informational
variables in the optic array can affect or be used to estimate the
time-to-contact (e.g., Koenderink, 1986; Tresilian, 1999; Michaels
et al., 2001).
Undoubtedly, the original work of Lee had a clear influence
in the study of the prospective control of movement from a
non-representational account, with crucial applications in sports
(Fajen et al., 2009), in the description of the information for
interception tasks (Michaels and Oudejans, 1992; Bootsma et al.,
1997; Fajen and Warren, 2004; Jacobs and Michaels, 2006; Craig
et al., 2009), prehension and graspability (Bootsma and van
Wieringen, 1992; Newell et al., 1993; van der Kamp et al., 1998);
the control of passing through sliding doors (Huet et al., 2009),
landing maneuvers in flight simulation (Huet et al., 2011)
driving behavior (Land and Lee, 1994), coordination dynamics
(Richardson et al., 2016; Akifumi et al., 2017; Nalepka et al.,
2017), or human locomotion (Lee and Lishman, 1977; Fajen and
Warren, 2003).
The Connecticut School
Several authors (Cutting, 1982; Chemero, 2009) have pointed
to possible differences between the original formulations
of J. J. Gibson and the claims of the Connecticut school,
mainly because of the strong version of specificity that the
latter defended. However, a reconstruction of the historical
and philosophical development of ecological psychology,
we think, requires the recognition of the position of the
Connecticut school both for its epistemological and ontological
consistency, and as responsible for the academic settling of the
discipline.
In his autobiography (1967), J. J. Gibson recalled his work at
the Psychology Unit of the United States air force during WWII,
when in the recruitment process they were testing the candidates’
aptitudes for piloting aircrafts, and wrote:
“The so-called ‘spatial’ abilities extracted from existing tests still
seem to me unintelligible. The fact is, I now think, that the
spatial performances of men and animals are based on stimulus-
information of a mathematical order that we did not even dream
of in the 1940s (...). And the building of apparatus to simulate
the stimulus-information in life situations is difficult when one
does not know what the information is.” (J. J. Gibson, 1967, p. 136,
emphasis added).
Which are the principles proposed by Turvey et al. (1981) for
knowing what the information is and how is it lawfully related
to the affordances? The concepts of specificity and effectivity are
central to explain their position.
Specificity
Turvey et al. (1981) proposed a strong version of specificity. That
is, the perceptual system detects information that is specific to
environmental properties relevant for the organism, the so-called
1:1 relations. There are, of course, redundant and not specific
variables to which perceivers may be attuned. But, very much in
the pragmatist tradition, those daily actions that are successfully
performed, they argued, are based on specific information.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 9 November 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 2228
fpsyg-09-02228 November 28, 2018 Time: 19:12 # 10
Lobo et al. The History and Philosophy of Ecological Psychology
The empirical research program of ecological psychology is the
description of the ecological information, the specifying variables
used in adapted behavior.
Concerning the deployment of the concept of specificity,
they proposed a two stages analysis of an affordance: first, to
isolate the environmental invariants related to the extension
of the affordance; second, to describe the light patterned and
to characterize the patterning as optic variables. Thus, by
transitivity, the relation between environment and information
and the relation between information and affordance allow us
to directly perceive the affordance (Turvey et al., 1981, pp. 264–
266). This has been characterized as a symmetrical law in which
the environment specifies information and information specifies
affordances, which leads to a 1:1:1: relation of these elements by
specification or unique correspondence (Chemero, 2009, p. 111).
As Turvey et al. (1981), acknowledged, probably the tau theory
described in section Affordances constitutes the first empirical
example of the accomplishments of this research program. Since
this pioneering work of Lee (1976) and Lee and Reddish (1981),
several other informational variables of different perception-
action systems were described. Among the outstanding ones are
the invariants in the inertia tensor in dynamic touch that we will
describe in section Other Developments.
Effectivities
The Connecticut School centered their efforts in developing the
concept of effectivity to answer how behavior can be regular
without being regulated (J. J. Gibson, 1979/2015, p. 215). The
concept of effectivity (a description of the behavioral capacities of
the organism) is necessary for establishing the relevant properties
of the environment. Then, a theory of action is needed. Turvey
et al. (1978) enunciated the two main problems that such a theory
had to face. First, the problem of degrees of freedom; second, the
context-variability of motor control.
Previous theories of human movement (e.g., Luria, 1966;
Turvey et al., 1978) conceived motor control as the central
programming and execution of motor programs that specify
each value or degree of freedom of all joints and muscles of the
skeletomuscular system. However, as Turvey et al. stated:
“The executive problem in this case is analogous to that of finding
the optimum of a function with many variables. Algorithms that
theoretically allow the solution of such problem prove to be
infeasible in practice” (Turvey et al., 1978, p. 559).
The second problem, context-variability, consists in that
motor programs do not guarantee the intended movement. It
refers to three main sources of variability: The first one is an
anatomical source, by which muscles vary in the role they have
in joint movement depending on the anatomical position. The
second source of variability comes from mechanical forces, so
that the relation of innervation and movement varies if the
segment is, for example, already in movement, generating inertial
forces. Finally, the third source of variability results from the
physiology of the innervation system. That is, the modulation of
the motoneurons varies so that the same activation may produce
different effects depending on the state of the muscle.
They offered an alternative approach to face these problems
by rejecting the idea of the control of individual variables: They
proposed that motor control consists of a smaller number of
“clusters” or collective variables whose control is internal and
relatively autonomous from other clusters. A classic example of
these collective variables is the relative phase of the swing of
legs and arms when walking (Turvey, 1990). Turvey et al. (1978)
proposed an approach consisting in coordinative structures
and coalitions. Coordinative structures refer to those collective
variables, and they were defined as groups of muscles, often
spanning several joints that are constrained to act as a unit.
Whereas coalitions refer to the (hierarchical) relations between
those structures and the mode of control.
Thus, Ecological psychology turned to the work of
Bernstein (1967) on the problems of degrees of freedom
(Latash and Turvey, 1996), and to dynamical and complex
systems approaches (Kelso et al., 1980; Kugler et al., 1980; Kugler
and Turvey, 1987; Beek, 1989; Beek and Turvey, 1992; Kelso,
1995) concerning autonomous control and self-organization.
There are, at least, two aspects of dynamical systems that
make them a useful tool within ecological psychology. First,
a dynamical system is an ensemble of elements forming a
unity that changes over time due to the interdependence of the
elements that shape the system. Second, the changing behavior
of the system is mathematically described and exhibit emergent
and self-organized behavior (Richardson and Chemero, 2014).
The use of dynamic and complex systems has been especially
fruitful in coordination dynamics (see, for example, Stoffregen
and Riccio, 1988; Turvey, 1990; Riley et al., 1999).
Other Developments
Once we have sketched the first developments beyond the work
of J. J. Gibson, in this section we try to introduce other areas of
research. It is beyond the scope of this paper to give a detailed
account of all the work performed in these areas, so we will focus
on the studies that initiated and motivated those lines.
Dynamic Touch
Contrary to the psychophysical analysis of touch as the sensibility
of the skin surface, J. J. Gibson (1962, 1966) defended the
active character of the haptic system, including dynamic touch
and the prominent role of the exploratory movements of the
hands. Thus, the seminal work of Solomon and Turvey (1988)
on perception through hand-held objects showed a canonical
example of the haptic system conceived as dynamic touching (see
section Perception-Action Loop and Perceptual Systems). This
work constituted a cornerstone in the study of touch, defining
one experimental paradigm and opening a new research field.
In his experiments, participants hold a rod from a single grip
and had to estimate its length. They could neither see the rods,
nor touch their ends. Experimenters found that participants
accurately matched the length of the rods. How could they
perceive the rod’s length wielding it from a single grip? Authors
stated that rotational dynamics played a crucial role. Participants
wielded the rod detecting its resistance to rotate (its moment
of inertia) through the muscular effort, so they accessed the
invariant information present in the inertia tensor of the rod. This
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tensor is a physical property directly related to the rod’s length
that is only accessed when wielding the rods.
Dynamic touch studies rapidly increased the areas of
inquiry, including the different movements (torques) needed to
diagonalize the inertia tensor (Solomon et al., 1989), how weight
is perceived (Amazeen and Turvey, 1996), or the perception of
different forms by wielding (Burton et al., 1990; Pagano and
Turvey, 1992; Turvey et al., 1992). Moreover, several studies
proposed that even proprioception (in particular, the position of
the extremities) is specified through their inertia tensor (Pagano
and Turvey, 1992; Pagano et al., 1996). A detailed review on
rotational dynamics and dynamic touch has been written by
Carello and Turvey (2000).
Affordances
The mathematical operationalization of affordances started with
the classic work of Warren (1984) on the perception of
climbability (reviewed in section Affordances) and continued
with the perception of passability (Warren and Whang, 1987).
This methodology has been applied to the study of several
affordances. According to Fajen et al. (2009), affordances can
be divided in two groups: body-scaled affordances and action-
scaled affordances. The first group refers to properties related
to the body dimensions of organisms. This is because the goal-
directed action needs specific dimensions of the environment
to fit the action; for example, the grasping pattern of an object
depends of the relation of object and hand sizes (e.g., Newell
et al., 1993; Cesari and Newell, 2002). The second group of
affordances are those properties related to the action-capabilities
of the organism. That is, the affordances are environmental
properties that allow action in relation to dynamic properties of
the perceiver’s movement. Classic examples of this type are optic
variables that specify the point of interception of a flying ball that
is visually tracked by a moving observer (e.g., Oudejans et al.,
1996).
After the publication of J. J. Gibson’s seminal work (J. J.
Gibson, 1979/2015) the term has been continuously spreading
among a wide variety of academic contexts, from architecture
(Maier et al., 2009; Rietveld and Rietveld, 2017) to robotics and
artificial intelligence (Effken and Shaw, 1992; Duchon et al.,
1998; Chemero and Turvey, 2007; Rome and Dorffner, 2008).
As an example, a Google Scholar’s search3 for the term in
the decade of 1980–1989 yielded 593 results, while in the
current decade (2010–2018) yielded 23500 results. The most
important problem related to this impressive growing is the
variety of meanings for the same word (Oliver, 2005). For
example, several authors argued that affordances are some kind of
mental representations (see for example, Vera and Simon, 1993;
Millikan, 2005), which contradicts direct perception and the
reciprocity of organism and environment. Important discussions
on the concept of affordances within ecological psychology can
be found in Chemero (2003), Michaels (2003), and Stoffregen
(2003). Reviews on the application of the concept of affordance
can be found in different areas: learning and development studies
3Search performed on May 23, 2018.
(Adolph et al., 1997), visual control of action (Fajen, 2007) and
sports (Fajen et al., 2009).
Development and Learning
As we could see in section Perceptual Learning, E. J. Gibson
defined development and learning as the process of using
available information to adjust behavior. The work of Adolph
followed this path studying how infants developed the perception
of affordances for locomotion (Adolph et al., 1993a,b). Afterward,
she extended her work to the study of the transition from
crawling to walking. Adolph studied crawling longitudinally
and systematically, describing the crawling behavior of infants
over different slopes. Adolph showed that infants engaged in a
circular behavior in which improvements in crawling produced
better estimations of slope inclination, and, conversely, better
estimation produced improvements in the crawling behavior.
Furthermore, Adolph et al. (1997, 1998) stated that no transfer
of the slope estimations happens in the transition from crawling
to walking, so infants had to learn new attunements.
One of the latest developments in perceptual learning is
the theory of direct learning (Jacobs and Michaels, 2007). This
theory defines a perceptual task in an informational space. In
such space, each point represents an informational variable
and trajectories from point to point represent the learning
process. The innovation of this approach lies in the mathematical
apparatus that let us observe the direct character of learning
represented by a path in the informational space. This path is
constrained by the vector field which represents the discrepancies
between judgments (actions) and feedback (outcomes). In other
words, learning depends on the convergent information that
(directly) pushes the agent to move from non-specific invariants
to (more) specific invariants, and this explains improvements in
performance. Thus, this theory states a direct learning hypothesis
(e.g., Jacobs et al., 2009).
This approach has been successfully applied to describe
perceptual learning in the form of change in variable use
(Runeson et al., 2000; Jacobs et al., 2001), and in calibration
(Bingham et al., 2000; Jacobs and Michaels, 2006). And it has
been applied also to several perceptual tasks, like touch (Michaels
et al., 2008; Withagen and Van Wermeskerken, 2009), or landing
maneuvers in flight simulators (Huet et al., 2011).
Social Coordination
In section Effectivities we saw that ecological psychology
approaches the problem of motor control through collective
variables. A classic example of this is the coordinated swing of
arms and legs, a field of study called coordination dynamics.
Schmidt et al. (1990) showed that the patterns of interlimb
coordination of the lower legs oscillations between two people
produce similar coordination patterns to that of the two legs
of a person, showing that the latter is not a pure mechanical
event. This study started a research area relating coordination
dynamics and social behavior called social coordination. Since the
publications of these results, studies on social coordination has
been an increasing field of research from an ecological dynamic
framework (see Schmidt and Richardson, 2008; Marsh et al.,
2009).
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 11 November 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 2228
fpsyg-09-02228 November 28, 2018 Time: 19:12 # 12
Lobo et al. The History and Philosophy of Ecological Psychology
Sports
One of the related areas of applied research that has been
greatly influenced by the concepts and research framework of
ecological psychology is sports. Some of the most relevant studies
in this field made use of outcomes achieved in the study of
timing and interception tasks and applied it to ball sports (e.g.,
Bootsma and van Wieringen, 1990; Peper et al., 1994; Craig et al.,
2000; Zaal and Michaels, 2003). Nonetheless, research on sports
was not limited to the analysis of ecological information, but
also to the dynamics of actions in sports (Araújo et al., 2006).
Representative publications summarizing research results and
theoretical position on this area can be found in Araújo and
Davids (2009), Beek (2009), and Fajen et al. (2009).
CONCLUSION
How is ecological psychology related to current approaches to
perception and action? Is neuroscience completely irrelevant
to ecological psychology? We think that ecological psychology
can be complemented by developments in other areas, as well
as other approaches can benefit from the results of ecological
psychology. For example, some approaches and disciplines are
currently accommodating an analysis of affordances, a concept
that has gained popularity in the recent years beyond the
scope of ecological psychology. This object of study and the
way it is analyzed by ecological psychology may illuminate the
complementarity of different approaches in order to offer a wider
picture of how psychological processes develop. For example,
a subpersonal analysis of neural processes in the brain can be
complemented by an upper-level analysis of which behavioral
patterns are used by the organism to pick-up ecological variables
in the environment. In this sense, neuroscience is not completely
irrelevant to ecological psychology: an analysis of the brain based
on neural dynamics complements the ecological approach since
it offers an explanation of how ‘resonance’ works (Raja, 2018),
as it was suggested by J. J. Gibson (1966, p. 5). In this sense,
as the influence of ecological psychology grows beyond its own
field of study, this very discipline can benefit from the outputs
of other approaches, specially the ones related to neurodynamics
(Freeman, 2000).
In this paper, we have presented a sketch of the theoretical
foundations and the historical development of ecological
psychology as a discipline, as well as its main innovations
and applied contributions for the philosophy of mind and
the cognitive sciences. We have tried to show that ecological
psychology offers one of the most powerful alternatives for
developing a non-representational and non-dualistic psychology
because of two reasons. First, because of the radical philosophical
position developed mainly by J. J. Gibson that confronted
the main weaknesses of the psychological theory, which are
the organism-environment, perception-action and objective-
subjective dichotomies. The second reason is that an increasing
number of scholars have engaged in the ecological program,
providing a growing empirical corpus. We hope that this paper
helps illustrating the theoretical innovations and methodological
contributions of ecological psychology.
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